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Abstract
We study the suitability of keystroke dynamics to authen-
ticate 100K users typing free-text. For this, we first analyze
to what extent our method based on a Siamese Recurrent
Neural Network (RNN) is able to authenticate users when
the amount of data per user is scarce, a common scenario
in free-text keystroke authentication. With 1K users for test-
ing the network, a population size comparable to previous
works, TypeNet obtains an equal error rate of 4.8% using
only 5 enrollment sequences and 1 test sequence per user
with 50 keystrokes per sequence. Using the same amount
of data per user, as the number of test users is scaled up
to 100K, the performance in comparison to 1K decays rela-
tively by less than 5%, demonstrating the potential of Type-
Net to scale well at large scale number of users. Our exper-
iments are conducted with the Aalto University keystroke
database. To the best of our knowledge, this is the largest
free-text keystroke database captured with more than 136M
keystrokes from 168K users.
1. Introduction
Keystroke dynamics is a behavioral biometric trait aimed
to recognize individuals based on their typing habits. The
velocity of pressing and releasing different keys [7], the
hand postures during typing [9], and the pressure exerted
when pressing a key [4] are some of the features taken into
account by keystroke biometric algorithms aimed to dis-
criminate among users. Although keystroke technologies
suffer of high intra-class variability, especially in free-text
scenarios (i.e. the input text typed is not previously fixed),
the ubiquity of keyboards as a method of text entry makes
keystroke dynamics a near universal modality to authenti-
cate users on the Internet.
Text entry is prevalent in day-to-day applications: un-
locking a smartphone, accessing a bank account, chatting
with acquaintances, email composition, posting content on
a social network, and e-learning [14]. As a means of user
authentication, keystroke dynamics is economical because
it can be easily integrated into the existing computer secu-
rity systems with minimal alteration and user intervention.
These properties have prompted several companies to cap-
ture and analyze keystrokes. The global keystroke dynam-
ics market will grow from $129.8 million dollars to $754.9
million by 2025, a rate of up to 25% per year [2]. As an
example, Google has recently committed $7 million dollars
to fund TypingDNA [3], a startup company which authenti-
cates people based on their typing behavior.
At the same time, the security challenges that keystroke
dynamics promises to solve are constantly evolving and get-
ting more sophisticated every year: identity fraud, account
takeover, sending unauthorized emails, and credit card fraud
are some examples [1]. In this context, keystroke biomet-
ric algorithms capable of authenticating individuals while
interacting with computer applications are more necessary
than ever. However, these challenges are magnified when
dealing with applications that have hundreds of thousands
to millions of users.
The literature on keystroke biometrics is extensive, but
to the best of our knowledge, these systems have only been
evaluated with up to several hundred users. While other
popular biometrics such as fingerprint and face recognition
have been evaluated at the million-user scale [22], the per-
formance of keystroke biometrics in large scale scenarios
remains unpublished.
The aim of this paper is to explore the feasibility and
limits of scaling a free-text keystroke biometric authentica-
tion system to 100,000 users. The main contributions of this
work are threefold:
1. We introduce TypeNet, a free-text keystroke biomet-
rics system based on a Siamese Recurrent Neural Net-
work (RNN) trained on 55M keystrokes from 68K
users, suitable for user authentication at large scale.
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2. We evaluate TypeNet in terms of Equal Error Rate
(EER) as the number of test users is scaled from 100 to
100,000 (independent from the training data). TypeNet
learns a feature representation of a keystroke sequence
without need for retraining if new subjects are added
to the database. Therefore, TypeNet is easily scalable.
3. We carry out a comparison with previous state-of-the-
art approaches for free-text keystroke biometric au-
thentication. The performance achieved by the pro-
posed method outperforms previous approaches in the
scenarios evaluated in this work.
In summary, we present the first evidence in the literature
of competitive performance of free-text keystroke biometric
authentication at large scale (100K test users). The results
reported in this work demonstrate the potential of this be-
havioral biometric for widespread deployment.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 summa-
rizes related works in free-text keystroke dynamics to set
the background. Section 3 describes the dataset used for
training and testing TypeNet. Section 4 describes the pro-
cessing steps and learning methods in TypeNet. Section 5
details the experimental protocol. Section 6 reports the ex-
periments and analyze the results obtained. Section 7 sum-
marizes the conclusions and future work.
2. Related Works and Background
Keystroke biometric systems are commonly placed into
two categories: fixed-text, where the keystroke sequence
typed by the user is prefixed, such as a username or pass-
word, and free-text, where the keystroke sequence is arbi-
trary, such as writing an email or transcribing a sentence
with typing errors, and different between training testing.
Biometric authentication algorithms based on keystroke dy-
namics for desktop and laptop keyboards have been pre-
dominantly studied in fixed-text scenarios where accuracies
higher than 95% are common [20]. Approaches based on
sample alignment (e.g. Dynamic Time Warping) [20], Man-
hattan distances [16], digraphs [8], and statistical models
(e.g. Hidden Markov Models) [5] have shown to achieve
the best results in fixed-text.
Nevertheless, the performances of free-text algorithms
are generally far from those reached in the fixed-text sce-
nario, where the complexity and variability of the text entry
contribute to intra-subject variations in behavior, challeng-
ing the ability to recognize users [23]. Monrose and Ru-
bin [18] proposed in 1997 a free-text keystroke algorithm
based on user profiling by using the mean latency and stan-
dard deviation of digraphs and computing the Euclidean
distance between each test sample and the reference pro-
file. Their results worsened from 90% to 23% of correct
classification rates when they changed both user’s profiles
and test samples from fixed-text to free-text. Gunetti and
Picardi [13] extended the previous algorithm to n-graphs.
They calculated the duration of n-graphs common between
training and testing and defined a distance function based
on the duration and order of such n-graphs. Their re-
sults of 7.33% classification error outperformed previous
state-of-the-art. Nevertheless, their algorithm needs long
keystroke sequences (between 700 and 900 keystrokes) and
many keystroke sequences (up to 14) to build the user’s
profile, which limits the usability of that approach. Mur-
phy et al. [21] more recently collected a very large free-
text keystroke dataset (∼2.9M keystrokes) and applied the
Gunetti and Picardi algorithm achieving 10.36% classifica-
tion error using sequences of 1,000 keystrokes and 10 gen-
uine sequences to authenticate users.
More recently than the pioneering works of Monrose and
Gunetti, some algorithms based on statistical models have
shown to work very well with free-text, like the POHMM
(Partially Observable Hidden Markov Models) [17]. This
algorithm is an extension of the traditional Hidden Markov
Models (HMMs), but with the difference that each hidden
state is conditioned on an independent Markov chain. This
algorithm is motivated by the idea that keystroke timings
depend both on past events and the particular key that was
pressed. Performance achieved using this approach in free-
text is close to fixed-text, but it again requires several hun-
dred keystrokes and has only been evaluated with a database
containing less than 100 users.
Nowadays, with the proliferation of machine learning al-
gorithms capable of analysing and learning human behav-
iors from large scale datasets, the performance of keystroke
dynamics in the free-text scenario has been boosted. As an
example, [28] proposes a combination of the existing di-
graphs method for feature extraction plus a Support Vector
Machine (SVM) classifier to authenticate users. This ap-
proach achieves almost 0% error rate using samples con-
taining 500 keystrokes. These results are very promising,
even though it is evaluated using a small dataset with only
34 users. More recently, in [10] the authors employ a Re-
current Neural Network (RNN) within a Siamese architec-
ture to authenticate users based on 8 biometric modalities
on smartphone devices. They achieved results in free-text of
81.61% TAR (True Acceptance Rate) at 0.1% FAR (False
Acceptance Rate) using just 3 second test windows with a
dataset of 37 users.
Previous works in free-text keystroke dynamics have
achieved promising results with up to several hundred users
(see Table 1), but they have yet to scale beyond this limit and
leverage emerging machine learning techniques that ben-
efit from vast amounts of data. Here we take a step for-
ward in this direction of machine learning-based free-text
keystroke biometrics by using the largest dataset published
to date with 136M keystrokes from 168K users. We ana-
lyze to what extent deep learning models are able to scale
Year [Ref] #Users #Seq. Sequence Size #Keys
1997 [18] 31 N/A N/A N/A
2005 [13] 205 1− 15 700− 900 keys 688K
2016 [28] 34 2 ∼ 7 keys 442K
2017 [21] 103 N/A 1,000 keys 12.9M
2018 [17] 55 6 500 keys 165K
2019 [10] 37 180K 3 seconds 6.7M
2020 Ours 168K 15 ∼ 70 keys 136M
Table 1. Comparison among different free-text keystroke datasets
employed in relevant related works. N/A = Not Available.
in keystroke biometrics to authenticate users at large scale
while attempting to minimize the amount of data per user
required for enrollment.
3. Keystroke Dataset
All experiments are conducted with the Aalto University
Dataset [11] that comprises more than 5GB of keystroke
data collected from 168,000 participants during a three
month time span. The acquisition task required subjects to
memorize English sentences and then type them as quickly
and accurate as they could. The English sentences were se-
lected randomly from a set of 1,525 examples taken from
the Enron mobile email and gigaword newswire corpora.
The example sentences contained a minimum of 3 words
and a maximum of 70 characters. Note that the sentences
typed by the participants could contain even more than 70
characters because each participant could forget or add new
characters when typing.
For the data acquisition, the authors launched an online
application that records the keystroke data from participants
who visit their webpage and agree to complete the acqui-
sition task (i.e. the data was collected in an uncontrolled
environment). Press (keydown) and release (keyup) event
timings were recorded in the browser with millisecond res-
olution using the JavaScript function Date.now. All par-
ticipants in the database completed 15 sessions (i.e. one
sentence for each session) on either a physical desktop or
laptop keyboard. The authors also reported demographic
statistics: 72% of the participants took a typing course, 218
countries were involved, and 85% of the participants have
English as native language.
4. System Description
4.1. Pre-processing and Feature Extraction
The raw data captured in each user session includes
a time series with three dimensions: the keycodes, press
times, and release times of the keystroke sequence. Times-
tamps are in UTC format with millisecond resolution, and
the keycodes are integers between 0 and 255 according to
A A B B
Press Release Press Release
TimeHL IL
PL
RL
Figure 1. Example of the 4 temporal features extracted between
two consecutive keys: Hold Latency (HL), Inter-key Latency (IL),
Press Latency (PL) and Release Latency (RL).
the ASCII code.
We extract 4 temporal features for each sequence (see
Figure 1 for details): (i) Hold Latency (HL): the elapsed
time between press and release key events; (ii) Inter-key
Latency (IL): the elapsed time between releasing a key and
pressing the next key; (iii) Press Latency (PL): the elapsed
time between two consecutive press events; and Release La-
tency (RL): the elapsed time between two consecutive re-
lease events. These 4 features are commonly used in both
fixed-text and free-text keystroke systems [6]. Finally, we
include the keycodes as an additional feature.
The 5 features are calculated for each keystroke in the
sequence. Let N be the length of the keystroke sequence,
such that each sequence provided as input to the model is a
time series with shape N × 5 (N keystrokes by 5 features).
All feature values are normalized before being provided as
input to the model. Normalization is important so that the
activation values of neurons in the input layer of the net-
work do not saturate (i.e. all close to 1). The keycodes are
normalized to between 0 and 1 by dividing each keycode
by 255, and the 4 timing features are converted to seconds.
This scales most timing features to between 0 and 1 as the
average typing rate over the entire dataset is 5.1 ± 2.1 keys
per second. Only latency features that occur either during
very slow typing or long pauses exceed a value of 1.
4.2. The Deep Model: LSTM Architecture
In keystroke dynamics, it is thought that idiosyncratic
behaviors that enable authentication are characterized by
the relationship between consecutives key press and release
events (e.g. temporal patterns, typing rhythms, pauses, typ-
ing errors). In a free-text scenario, keystroke sequences
may differ in both length and content. This reason moti-
vates us to choose a Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) as
our keystroke authentication algorithm. RNNs have demon-
strated to be one of the best algorithms to deal with tempo-
ral data (e.g. [25], [26]) and are well suited for free-text
keystroke sequences (e.g. [10], [15]).
Our RNN model is depicted in Figure 2. It is composed
Figure 2. Architecture of TypeNet for free-text keystroke se-
quences. The input x is a time series with shapeM×5 (keystrokes
× keystroke features) and the output f(x) is an embedding vector
with shape 1× 128.
of two Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM) layers of 128
units. Between the LSTM layers, we perform batch nor-
malization and dropout at a rate of 0.5 to avoid overfitting.
Additionally, each LSTM layer has a dropout rate of 0.2.
One constraint when training a RNN using standard
backpropagation through time applied to a batch of se-
quences is that the number of elements in the time dimen-
sion (i.e. number of keystrokes) must be the same for all
sequences. Let’s fix the size of the time dimension to M . In
order to train the model with sequences of different lengths
N within a single batch, we truncate the end of the input
sequence when N > M and zero pad at the end when
N < M , in both cases to the fixed size M . Error gradi-
ents are not computed for those zeros and do not contribute
to the loss function at the output layer thanks to the Masking
layer indicated in Figure 2.
Finally, the output of the model f(x) is an array of size
1 × 128 that we will employ later as an embedding feature
vector to authenticate users.
5. Experimental Protocol
Our goal is to build a keystroke biometric system capable
of generalizing to new users not seen during model training.
For this, we train our deep model in a Siamese framework
which allows us to employ different users to train and test
the authentication system. The RNN must be trained only
once on an independent set of users. This model then acts as
a feature extractor that provides input to a simple distance-
threshold based authentication scheme. After training the
RNN once, we evaluate authentication performance for a
varying number of users and enrollment samples per user.
5.1. Siamese Training
In Siamese training, the model has two inputs (i.e.
two keystroke sequences from either the same or different
users), and therefore, two outputs (i.e. embedding vectors).
During the training phase, the model will learn discrimi-
native information from the pairs of keystroke sequences
and transform this information into an embedding space
where the embedding vectors (the outputs of the model) will
be close in case both keystroke inputs belong to the same
user (genuine pairs), and far in the opposite case (impostor
pairs).
For this, we use the Contrastive loss function defined
specifically for this task [24]. Let xi and xj each be a
keystroke sequence that together form a pair which is pro-
vided as input to the model. The contrastive loss calculates
the Euclidean distance between the model outputs:
dC(xi, xj) = ‖f(xi)− f(xj)‖ (1)
where f(xi) and f(xj) are the model outputs (embedding
vectors) for the inputs xi and xj , respectively. The model
will learn to make this distance small (close to 0) when the
input pair is genuine and large (close to α) for impostor
pairs by computing the loss function L defined as follows:
L = (1− Lij)d
2(xi, xj)
2
+ Lij
max2 {0, α− d(xi, xj)}
2
(2)
where Lij is the label associated with each pair that is set
to 0 for genuine pairs and 1 for impostor ones, and α ≥ 0
is the margin (the maximum margin between genuine and
impostor distances).
We train the RNN using only the first 68K users in the
dataset. From this subset we generate genuine and impos-
tor pairs using all the 15 keystroke sequences available for
each user. This provides us with 15 × 68K×15 = 15.3M
impostor pair combinations and 15 × 14/2 = 105 genuine
pair combinations for each user. The pairs were chosen ran-
domly in each training batch ensuring that the number of
genuine and impostor pairs remains balanced (512 pairs in
total in each batch including impostor and genuine pairs).
Note that the remaining 100K users will be employed only
to test the model, so there is no data overlap between the
two groups of users (open-set authentication paradigm).
Regarding the training details, the best results were
achieved with a learning rate of 0.05, Adam optimizer with
β1 = 0.9, β2 = 0.999 and  = 10−8, and the margin set to
α = 1.5. The model was trained for 200 epochs with 150
batches per epoch and 512 sequences in each batch. The
model was built in Keras-Tensorflow.
#enrollment sequences per user G
1 2 5 7 10
30 9.53 8.00 6.43 5.95 5.49
50 7.56 6.04 4.80 4.23 3.73
70 7.06 5.55 4.38 3.87 3.35
100 6.98 5.49 4.29 3.85 3.33
#k
ey
sp
er
se
qu
en
ce
M
150 6.97 5.46 4.29 3.85 3.33
Table 2. Equal Error Rate (%) achieved for different values of the
parametersM (sequence length) andG (number of enrollment se-
quences per user).
5.2. Testing
We authenticate users by comparing gallery samples xg
belonging to one of the users in the test set to a query sam-
ple xq from either the same user (genuine match) or another
user (impostor match). The test score is computed by aver-
aging the Euclidean distances dE between each gallery em-
bedding vector f(xg) and the query embedding vector f(xq)
as follows:
score =
1
G
G∑
g=1
dE(f(xg), f(xq)) (3)
where G is the number of sequences in the gallery (i.e. the
number of enrollment samples). Taking into account that
each user has a total of 15 sequences, we retain 5 sequences
per user as test set (i.e. each user has 5 genuine test scores)
and let G vary between 1 ≤ G ≤ 10 in order to evalu-
ate the performance as a function of number of enrollment
sequences.
To generate impostor scores, for each enrolled user we
choose one test sample from each remaining user. We de-
fine K as the number of enrolled users. In our experiments,
we vary K in the range 100 ≤ K ≤ 100,000. Therefore
each user has 5 genuine scores and K − 1 impostor scores.
Note that we have more impostor scores than genuine ones,
a common scenario in keystroke dynamics authentication.
The results reported in the next section are computed in
terms of Equal Error Rate (EER), which is the value where
False Acceptance Rate (FAR, proportion of impostors clas-
sified as genuine) and False Rejection Rate (FRR, propor-
tion of genuine users classified as impostors) are equal. The
error rates are calculated for each user and then averaged
over all K users [19].
6. Experiments and Results
6.1. Performance vs User Data
As commented in the related works section, one key fac-
tor when analyzing the performance of a free-text keystroke
authentication algorithm is the amount of keystroke data per
user employed for enrollment. In this work, we study this
factor with two variables: the keystroke sequence length M
and the number of gallery sequences used for enrollmentG.
Our first experiment reveals to what extent M and G af-
fect the authentication performance of our model. Note that
the input to our model has a fixed size of M after the Mask-
ing process shown in Figure 2. For this experiment, we set
K = 1,000 where K is the number of enrolled users.
Table 2 summarizes the error rates achieved for the dif-
ferent values of sequence length M and enrollment se-
quences per user G. We can observe that for sequences
longer than M = 70 there is no significant improvement in
the performance. Adding three times more key events (from
M = 50 to M = 150) lowers the EER by only 0.57% for
all values of G. However, adding more sequences to the
gallery shows greater improvements with about 50% rela-
tive error reduction when going from 1 to 10 sequences in-
dependent of M . The best results are achieved for M = 70
and G = 10 with an error rate of 3.35%. For one-shot
authentication (G = 1), our approach has an error rate of
7.06% using sequences of 70 keystrokes. These results sug-
gest that our approach achieves a performance close to that
of a fixed-text scenario (within ∼5% error rate) even when
the data is scarce. For the following experiments, we set
M = 50 and G = 5 to have a good trade-off between per-
formance and amount of user data.
6.2. Comparison with State-of-the-Art Works
We now compare the proposed TypeNet with our im-
plementation of two state-of-the-art algorithms for free-text
keystroke authentication: one based on statistical models,
the POHMM (Partially Observable Hidden Markov Mod-
els) from [17], and another algorithm based on digraphs
and SVM from [28]. To allow fair comparisons, all models
are trained and tested with the same data and experimental
protocol: G = 5 enrollment sequences per user, M = 50
keystrokes per sequence, K = 1,000 test users.
In Figure 3 we plot the performance of the three ap-
proaches with the Aalto dataset described in Section 3.
We can observe that TypeNet outperforms previous state-
of-the-art free-text algorithms in this scenario where the
amount of enrollment data is reduced (5×M = 250 train-
ing keystrokes in comparison to more than 10,000 in re-
lated works, see Section 2), thanks to the Siamese training
step. The Siamese RNN has learned to extract meaning-
ful features from the training dataset, which minimizes the
amount of data needed for enrollment. The SVM gener-
Figure 3. ROC comparison in free-text biometric authentica-
tion between the proposed TypeNet and two state-of-the-art ap-
proaches: POHMM from [17] and digraphs/SVM from [28]. M =
50 keystrokes per sequence,G = 5 enrollment sequences per user,
1 test sequence per user, and K = 1,000 test users.
ally requires a large number of training sequences per user
(∼100), whereas in this experiment we have only 5 training
sequences per user. We hypothesize that the lack of training
samples contributes to the poor performance (near chance
accuracy) of the SVM.
6.3. User Authentication at Large Scale
In the last experiment, we evaluate to what extent our
model is able to generalize without performance decay. For
this, we scale the number of enrolled users K from 100 to
100,000. Remember that for each user we have 5 genuine
test scores and K − 1 impostor scores, one against each
other test user. The model used for this experiment is the
same trained for previous section (68,000 independent users
included in the training phase).
Figure 4 shows the authentication results for one-shot en-
rollment (G = 1 enrollment sequences,M = 50 keystrokes
per sequennce) and the balanced scenario (G = 5,M = 50)
for different values of K. We can observe that for both sce-
narios there is a slight performance decay when we scale
from 100 to 5,000 test users, which is more pronounced
in the one-shot scenario. However, for a large number of
users (K ≥ 10,000), performance stabilizes in both scenar-
ios. These results demonstrate the potential of the Siamese
RNN architecture in TypeNet to authenticate users at large
scale in free-text keystroke dynamics.
7. Conclusions
We have presented TypeNet, a new free-text keystroke
biometrics system based on a Siamese RNN architecture,
and experimented with it at large scale in a dataset of 136M
keystrokes from 168K users. Siamese networks have shown
Figure 4. EER of our proposed TypeNet when scaling up the num-
ber of test users K in one-shot (G = 1 enrollment sequences per
user) and balanced (G = 5) authentication scenarios. M = 50
keystrokes per sequence.
to be effective in face recognition tasks when scaling up
to hundreds of thousands of identities. The same capacity
has been also shown by our TypeNet in free-text keystroke
biometrics.
In all scenarios evaluated, specially when there are many
users but few enrollment samples per user, the results
achieved in this work suggest that our model outperforms
previous state-of-the-art algorithms. Our results range from
9.53% to 3.33% EER, depending on the amount of user
data enrolled. A good balance between performance and the
amount of enrollment data per user is achieved with 5 en-
rollment sequences and 50 keystrokes per sequence, which
yields an EER of 4.80% for 1K test users. Scaling up the
number of test users does not significantly affect the per-
formance: the EER of TypeNet decays only 5% in relative
terms with respect to the previous 4.80% when scaling up
from 1K to 100K test users. Evidence of the EER stabi-
lizing around 10K users demonstrates the potential of this
architecture to perform well at large scale.
For future work, we will improve the way training pairs
are chosen in Siamese training. Recent work has shown
that choosing hard pairs during the training phase can im-
prove the quality of the embedding feature vectors [27]. We
plan to test our model with other databases, and investigate
smarter ways to combine the multiple sources of informa-
tion [12], e.g., the multiple distances in Equation (3).
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